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JUDGES AND ADVOCATES OF KENTUCKY.*
E. J.

McDERMOTT.

Goethe said that the fittest word makes no impression, if the
hearer "eim Schiefohr ist"--a man with a crooked or dull ear. If
I may adopt the style which we are accustomed to use when representing some grievously wronged or basely persecuted man, woman
or corporation before a jury, I may say that, in such an assembly
as this of wits, scholars and wise men, I must be fortunate if I can
always hit upon the words or phrases deemed fit by such a select
and splendid jury of my peers. Coleridge, who was not satisfied with
the reputation of being only a scholar and poet, once said to Lamb:
"'Charles, did you ever hear me preach?" To which Lamb replied:
"I never heard you do anything else."
Since historical records became reasonably clear, fair and full,
it seems that the men of every nation or age have been easily persuaded that they were wiser and more civilized than any of their
predecessors anywhere in the world. Most men believe what a few
shrewder men, for some reason, good or bad, desire others to believe. As Cardinal Newman said, most men, especially in matters outside the ordinary affairs of life, are persuaded to adopt an opinion,
not so much by reason or argument as by dogmatic teaching from
those they respect.
Great changes are going on in the opinions, customs and laws of
our own country and of other countries. Mlan is a very imitative
animal. Imitation goes on more rapidly and over greater areas than
ever before, because of the great increase in newspapers, magazines
and books, in travel, trade and inventions. A w11-organized, unknown literary-bureau, with abundant money, can, without arousing
opposition, accomplish greater, and sometimes more dangerous, re*Reprlnted by permission of the American Law Review, Vol. IV., No. S.
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sults than the old-fashioned demagogue whose power for evil was
finally diminished as his characteristics, methods and record became well known.
In Blackstone's Commentaries, where the origin of the jury
system is discussed, its origin is traced either to King Alfred or to
the cusions of the Germanic nations. In Blackstone's time, on religious and political grounds, it was thought best to find the origin
of all good things in North of Europe; and, for several centuries
-in fact, until the late war-it was customary to read and hear in
England and America expressions of great contempt for the Latin
nations. This war has turned the current the other way. Hallam,
in 1848, in his notes to his View o the Middle Ages, said that the
English jury-system, as we know it, arose in the time of Henry the
Second, who reigned from 1154 to 1199. In one of his notes, he hurls
his just contempt at "that preposterous relic of barbarism, the requirement of unanimity." In 1891, when we were making a new
Constitution for Kentucky, a few of us in the Convention succeeded in the effort to provide thereafter for majority verdicts in civil
cases. In 1876 our Legislature adopted the Civil Code based in part
on the old English system of technical pleading and procedure,
though England had discarded that ingenious but archaic system
three years before.
On November 4, 1912, the Supreme Court of the United States
wisely revised the old rules of pleading and practice in courts of
equity of the United States, adopted in 1842, and threw aside some
ancient absurdities. A busy lawyer is no longer compelled to puzzle
his brain over the "practice of the High Court of Chancery in England," as modified by the General Orders of Lords Cottenham and
Langsdale in 1841 and as expounded in Daniel's Chancery Pleading
and Practice published in 1837, which edition (not the later editions)
was long held to be "high authority" for those who could patiently
follow its intricate and escape its pitfalls. (Thomas v. Wooster,
114 U. S. 112, decided March, 1885). I sometimes wished that this
Daniel had been hurled into a den of fiercer lions than those that
spared his biblical ancestor. Like the dude who turned up the legs
of his trousers on a beautiful day. in New York because it might be
raining in London, we clung to some absurdities in English equity
practice long after England had discarded them.

Judges and Advocates of Kentucky
What is occurring in one of our states is usually occurring in
others. On February 4, 1920, the total number of cases on the
dockets of the two chancellors in Louisville was 97. Of that number
56 were divorce cases, a majority of 15. Today one of the chancellors granted 40 divorces, about half white and half black. I believe the chancellor said that not one of them was defended. That
would have been startling to a prior generation; but a danger signal
rarely means much to the blind or the deaf.
About thirty years or more ago there were, I believe, about
400 lawyers at our bar. Then Louisville's population was half what
it is now. The representative of a law-book company here told me
lately that there were 500 lawyers in Louisville in June, 1912; in
November, 1919, we had only 343 lawyers and they were gathered
together in 181 offices. Since March, 1918, seventy lawyers have
died in the State; since June, 1918, only 17 lawyers were admitted
to the bar here; but immediately prior to June, 1918, at which time
the new act regulating admission to the bar went into effect, many
men in Eastern Kentucky, it is said, were admitted. During the
war two Louisville lawyers were killed. Seven died in the service.
Mr. C. A. Gardner, my secretary, while I was Lieutenant Governor,
was killed at the front in France; Mr. Alex. P. Humphrey, Jr., lost
his life on an Aviation Field in Texas. It is clear that the practice
is changing; that the business of the courts and the number of the
law's votaries have not increased in proportion to the growth of
our population; that something still remains to be done to make
the Temple of Justice a safe and comfortable abode for those who,
after a little study of the law, would like to win quickly a laurel
crown and live like Solomon in all his glory.
There is a great difference between the learning and talents required of a judge and those required of an advocate. Both, of
course, need literary and thorough legal training, but patient, kindly attention and a calm, well-balanced, impartial judgment are
more important for a judge; suavity, shrewdness, tact, imagination,
and the gift of eloquence are more important to the advocate. An excellent bar is necessary to produce good judge; good judges have a
great influence in creating an excellent bar. It is noticed in all
nations and in all ages that great men encourage and stimulate others
around them, and so we notice in history that great artists, authors,
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scientists, lawyers and physicians appear in groups. It was so in
classic times; it has been so since the birth of Christ.
In the winning of jury cases, a lawyer's knowledge of the law
and his preparation of his cases and his skill in the handling of
witnesses, advantages which even mediocre men may acquire by
much practice, are generally more important than his speeches; but
without ability in debate, fine judgment, real scholarship, genuine
culture, and the rare gift of imagination, he cannot hope to become
a distinguished advocate. Really great advocates are as rare as
great poets, great historians, or great military leaders. No man ha,
ever won lasting fame as an orator unless by hard study, constant
writing and frequent practice, he has thoroughly mastered his own
language and acquired at least a moderate degree of familiarity with
the world's history and the masterpieces of its litreature. Patrick
Henry was a rare exception, but his fame rests mainly on one short.
bold, inspiring speech delivered at a critical, historical period on
a burning theme, which he expounded as only a man of extraordinary gifts could. In Wirt's Life of Henry (1817) is a concise review of the chief difference between the Federalists and the Democrats, then called Republicans. The Democratic leaders in Virginia.
Jefferson and Henry, were said by Wirt to have "declared themselves the friends of liberty and the people, and the firm advocates
of a government of the people by the people," a phrase silghtly
altered by Lincoln in his Gettysburg speech by the addition of the
w6rds "for the people," without any material alteration of the
thought.
Eloquence is the art of clearly, vividly expressing, in spoken
or written words, virile, tender or noble thoughts and emotions that
excite responsive thoughts and emotions in others. Oratory, a branch
of eloquence, is the art of persuading and stirring others by apt words
and fit action and of inducing them to do what the orator desires.
Eloquence, whether written or oral, can appear only when the man,
the theme, and the occasion are fit and come together. The ancients
said: "Pectus est qiiod disertos faeit, et vis mentis." It is the heart
and the power of the mind that make a man eloquent. The greatest
advocate, orator and political leader of the past century, in the
opinion of Wendell Phillips, himself a stirring, scholarly, and popular orator, was Daniel O'Connell, for thirty years the practical
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ruler of an enslaved, high-spirited nation eager to be free. The
greatest political philosopher and orator of the eighteenth century was
Edmund Burke, another Irishman. Sir William Temple said: "That
cause seems commonly the better that has the better advocate."
In Burke's immortal speech on American Taxation in 1774, he,
referring to Air. Greenville, said: "He was bred to the law, which
is, in my opinion, one of the first and noblest of human sciences;
a science which does more to quicken and invigorate the understanding than all the other kinds of learning put together; but it is not
apt, except in persons very happily born, to open and liberalize the
mind exactly in the same proportion." Charles Summer once wrote
to a friend at the Harvard Law School: "A lawyer must know
everything. He must know law, history, philosophy, human nature,
and, it he covets the fame of an advocate, he must drink of all the
springs of literature, giving ease and elegance to the mind and illustration to whatever subject he touches."
Cicero said: "He is the eloquent man who can treat subjects of
an humble nature with delicacy, great things impressively, and
moderate things temperately . . . Eloquence is the companion
of peace, the associate of a life of leisure, and the pupil, as we may
say, of a State that is properly constituted. . . . Nescire awtem,
quid antea quam natlts sis, acciderit, id est semper esse puerm.'"
Not to know what happened before you were born is always to be a
boy. Only a thorough student of history and philosophy and literature can be a great orator.
A lawyer has less to do with logic than with dialectic, the art of
controversy, the art of intellectual fencing, which enables one to get
the best of an adversary in a debate. However shrewd or skillful
we may be, we are surer of success when we are on the right side;
but, though on the right side, we may be overthrown by one more
skillful in dialectic. Which is the right side is often in grave doubt
until adversaries, with all their strength, have fought over the case
with zeal and skill.
The pursuits, interests, virtues, and vices of men differ little in
one age from those of another, when the people have about the same
grade of civilization. I have said that Blackstone and Hallam, when
discussing the origin of the jury in England, gave no hint that
juries had been used in classic times. In Athens, about four hun-
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dred years before the birth of Christ, and later in Rome, the jury
system resembled ours in many important respects, and majority
verdicts were allowed in both civil and criminal cases. Of course,
there were differences; but anybody familiar with Roman trials in
the century before Christ knows that a jury trial then was, in many
important particulars, like a jury trial here. Anyone that ever read
Quintillian on the Education of an Orator knows that his rules for
the preliminary handling of a client, on the examination of witnesses and the making of speeches to the jury, and even his warning against the little tricks used in jury trials, are useful now; that,
with a few changes that part of his work would seem modern to a
reader today. Quintillian, for example, warned his students to
beware lest a volunteer witness be an enemy in disguise. Some
years ago in this city a murderer was acquitted by the testimony
of a witness who had evidently been sent to the Commonwealth's
Attorney as one eager to convict the accused, who was put on the
stand as a witness for the Commonwealth, and who caused the ruin
of the Commonwealth's case and the acquittal of the accused.
Ordinarily, the fame of the lawyer is ephemeral. Most of his
efforts are spent in attacking or defending some private citizen or
corporation. In a ease of that sort, the public has only a feeble or
temporary interest. The law questions involved and the evidence introduced must be fairly well known to the hearer or reader of a
fine argument before a court or jury to enable him to understand
the skill and talent of the advocate. Few lawyers have made a great
and enduring reputation unless they made their best effort on some
-ase of historical or political importance. Only orations of that
kind-on a great historic occasion-written with great literary skillcan win instant applause and remain famous for generations. They
appeal to all classes and all times. Hence, the orations of Demosthenes,
Cicero, Burke, Erskine, Grattan, Curran, Daniel Webster and Patrick Henry have long found ardent, admiring readers. They were
masterpieces of literature. Such was the oration of Sir Charles
Russell, afterwards Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Chief Justice
of England, the first Catholic Lord Chief Justice of England after
the Reformation, when he triumphantly defended Charles Stewart
Parnell and his associates against the London Times, and exposed the
forged letters of Pigott who had sold them to the Times when it was
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trying to ruin Parnell and his cause. Such an oration was that of
Demosthenes in defense of his public life and of the Crown conferred on him and Cicero's defense of Milo; John Philpot Curran's
defense of Archibald Hamilton Rowan for a libel, in the Court of
King's Bench, Ireland, in November, 1794; the defense of Thomas
Erskine, afterward Lord Chancellor of England, in behalf of Stockdale on a charge of libel before the King's Bench of England on
December 9, 1789.
Thomas Noon Talfourd, in a speech after the death of Sir
William Follett, said:
"What remains 7 A name dear to the affections of a few friends;
the waning image of a modest and earnest speaker, though decidedly
the head of the common law bar, and the splendid example of a success embodied in a fortune of two hundred thousand pounds, acquired in ten years, the labors of which hastened the extinction of
his life. These are all the world possesses of Sir William Follett.
To mankind, to his country, to his profession, he left nothing; not
a measure conceived, not a danger averted, not a principle vindicated,
not a speech intrinsically worth preservation, not a striking image
nor an affecting sentiment; in his death the power of mortality is
supreme. How sadly strange that a course so splendid should end
in darkness so obscure."
In Rome, about the the of Christ, jurors were usually taken
from the list of Senators and Kinghts, as, in former times in Louisville, jurors were usually taken from lists composed of prominent
men engaged in business and prosperous farmers. The Praetor, who
directed the trials between citizens in Rome, was guided as to the
law by learned lawyers known as Juris-consults, men who also prepared cases for men like Cicero, just as attorneys in England now
prepare cases for the barristers. Only the latter conduct cases in
court. In our city and State, lawyers have been accustomed to conduct all sorts of cases and to do the work of both an English attorney
and an English barrister; but the tendency toward concentration
here will probably bring out finally a system something like that in
England. Sir Charles Russell was perhaps the only 'attorney" who
ever qualified himself as a barrister and then rose to distinction.
Lord Chief Justice Coleridge said: "Russell is the biggest advocate
of the century." It has been well said that "it was his striking per-
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sonality, added to his skill and adroitness, which seemed to give him
his overwhelming influence over the witnesses whom he cross-ecamined:" that he and Curran, O'Connell and Rufus Choate were
"great actors."
We have had little trouble from the corruption of jurors, but
jurors here, as elsewhere, are generally governed by public sentiment, and reflect that sentiment, consciously or unconsciously, in
their verdicts. That is the reason it is so hard to convict a murderer
in this or any other State. The jurors get their impressions not only
from their neighbors but also from the press, which, in England,
is not allowed by the courts to abuse its privilege by sensational, inaccurate or biased reports of pending cases. When Cato, Pompey's
fatherdn-law, was to be tried in Rome, 350 jurors were summoned,
and most of them went to Pompey's home before they went to court
on the morning of the trial. *When the prosecutor heard that, he
abandoned the case.
When Clodius was prosecuted by Milo, there were 57 jurors
sworn to try the case. During the trial, they requested a bodyguard of the Senate. Clodius was acquitted by a vote of 32 to 25.
Catullus, a Senator, after the verdict, said to one of the jurors; "Why
did you ask for a guard? Were you afraid your money would be
taken from you?" Cicero was one of the witnesses against Clodius.
Later, in the debate in the Senate, Clodius said to Cicero: "The
jury in my case gave you no credit." Cicero replied: "Twenty-five
of the jury gave me credit, but thirty-two gave you no eredit, for
they made you pay them in advance." In the trial of Mlo later for
killing Clodius on a highway near Rome, there were 51 jurors; 38
voted for c9nviction, 13 for acquittal. The jurors could vote for
acquittal, for conviction, or that the charge was "not proven."
Curran and Mr. Fitzgibbon, later Lord Chancellor Clare in
Dublin, were long bitter enemies on political grounds, and fought
a duel while they were both members of the Irish House of Commons. That was before the union of England and Ireland had been
obtained by wholesale corruption with money and titles, a scheme
carried out by Lord Castlereagh under the guidance of William Pitt.
At that time no Catholic in Ireland could vote. Probably not onefifth, or even one-tenth, of the people could vote for the members of
the Irish House of Commons. Lord Byron said, in the English House
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of Lords, that this union was "the union of the shark with its prey."
An Irish noble, who had been a member of the Irish House of Lords
before the union, once said to Curran, pointing to the old Parliament House in Dublin: "What do they mean to do with that useless building? For myself, I hate even the sight of it?" "I don't
wonder at it, my lord," said Curran; "I never yet heard of a
murderer who was not afraid of a ghost."
On one occasion, when Curran was making an argument before
his old enemy, Lord Clare, the latter was plainly paying very scant
attention, and, a part of the time, was stooping over and fondling his
dog. When Curran observed that, he stopped and remained silent
a few moments. Lord Clare looked up and said, "Go on, Mr. Curran,
go on," Curran replied: "I beg pardon, my Lord, I thought your
Lordship was employed in consultation."
In Kentucky two law suits caused the tragic death of two judges.
Colonel Thomas Buford, on account of a decision of the Court of
Appeals, murdered Judge John M. Elliott. John Elliott was born
May 16, 1820, in Virginia, but moved to Eastern Kentucky. He
had been a member of the Legislature and was in Congress from 1853
until 1859. In December, 1861, he was re-elected to Congress; but,
after he was indicted in the U. S. District Court of Kentucky for
joining the Confederacy, his name was stricken from the roll of the
House. He was first a circuit judge and later a judge of the Court
of Appeals. In Buford v. Guthrie, 14 Bush 677, the court decided
against Col. Thomas Buford, who had an interest at stake, and
the latter killed Judge Elliott on the steps of the Capital Hotel at
Frankfort, March 26, 1879, with a double-barrel shotgun" loaded with
buckshot. Judge Hines had just left Judge Elliott a moment before. Judge Elliott was then about 59 years old. Buford was indicted in the Franklin Circuit Court, but was tried in Owen County.
He pleaded insanity. The jury convicted him July 23, 1879, and
fixed his punishment at imprisonment for life in the penitentiary.
(Judge W. Ii. Jackson, Sr., of Louisville, presided at the trial.) There
was the usual sort of absurd expert testimony on the question of
insanity; and, after the verdict, Judge William L. Jackson, Sr., who
presided at the trial, ordered the convict to be sent to the Anchorage
Asylum; but, in a short time, Buford walked away from the asylum
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and went to Indiana. That state, so kind to some of our criminals,
would not return Buford to Kentucky, and so he went scot-free.
In Howard v. Cornelison (Feb., 1884), in the Superior Court,
5 Ky. L: Reporter 902, the court, in an opinion rendered by Judge
A. E. 'Richards, held that Cornelison, the defendant's attorney, was
a party to an attempt to defraud certain attaching creditors. Cornelison was a lawyer of Mount Sterling, "and that was the home of
Judge Reid of the Superior Court. Cornelison thought that Judge
Reid was at least partly responsible for the decision of the case,
though Judge Reid was really absent when the decision was reached
and the opinion rendered. When Reid next came home, Cornelison
asked him to come to his office, saying that he would show Judge
Reid some papers there. Judge Reid went to the office, and, while
not suspecting any trouble, was assaulted by Cornelison with a cane
and cowhide. Judge Reid was unarmed and stunned and fled from
the office. He was at the time a candidate for judge of the Court of
Appeals. Later, at a public meeting at Mount Sterling, he explained
the whole matter to the people, saying he was absent when the decision was rendered and that' he was assaulted without warning and
stunned by the blows he had received and hardly knew what he was
doing when he retreated from the office; and he also said he would
continue to prosecute his canvass as a candidate for a seat on the
bench of the Court of Appeals; but, on May 15, 1884, he was found
dead in the room over the law office of Judge Brock, with a pistol by
his side. The coroner's jury said it was a case of suicide. The family
said it was a murder. Cornelison was indicted for malicious assault
and battery and was convicted. The jury fixed "his punishment
at a fine of one cent and costs and imprisonment in the county jail
for three years." He appealed first to the Superior Court (7 Ky. L.
R. 344); and then to the Court of Appeals (84 Ky. 583) but the
judgment was affirmed. Judge Reid was acultivated, conscientious
man and a good lawyer. After the shock of the assault, he was unwilling to engage in a duel with Cornelison or to shoot him at sight;
but the public sentiment at the time was that he should have fought
0rnelison at the time or later. The knowledge of this sentiment so
tortured Judge Reid that he took his own life.
The resolutions often adopted at our bar meetings when a member of the bar has died, gradually became so fulsome and extravagant
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and were entitled to so little respect that the Louisville Bar Association tried to abolish the custom. The effort succeeded for a while,
but not long. When Judge I. W. Edwards died, the Hon. Isaac T.
Woodson, a nervous but fine man, was appointed chairman of the
committee to prepare the resolutions. Some of the foremost members of the bar were on the committee. When the judge presiding
at the bar meeting called for a report and Mr. Woodson was about
to offer it, he suddenly remembered that he must get the other members of the committee to sign it. He hurriedly sought them among
the crowd at the meeting to get their signatures, but when he had
read his report he discovered that the other members of the committee had signed, not the resolutions, but a judgment which he had
prepared for one of the courts in a pending suit The bar meeting
had to be delayed until Mr. Woodson could find the members of the
committee and get their signatures to the resolutions. They were
willing, without reading, to sign anything.
When we read ordinary biographies, long or short, we usually
realize that most of them are merely padded panegyrics and of little
value. Books purporting to be local or State histories and published
by speculators or book manufacturers are usually so fulsome and
inaccurate as to be ridiculous to those who know. In them, as in
affidavits, the truth seldom leaks out, except by accident. They generally convince the thoughtful reader that tombstones and funeral
orators are not the only prevaricators in the world. In truth, it is
not easy to be at the same time accurate and brief and yet interesting, discriminating and just.
When I came to the bar, one of its distinguished members was
Judge William S. Bodley, who was born June 6, 1806, at Lexington, Kentucky, of a distinguished family. He received his literary
education at Transylvania University, and studied law in the offices
of eminent lawyers. He began the practice of law in Vicksburg,
lississippi, and later was elected circuit judge there. He was
one of the organizers of the Vicksburg & Charleston Railroad; and, I
believe, its first president. Suretyship for others ruined him fnancially early in his career; but he, nevertheless, out of later earnings,
finally paid all those debts, when no longer legally bound. He was
for many years the attorney of the city of Louisville, as for other

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
private clients, before the office of city attorney was permanently
established.
When his son, Temple Bodley, and I were at the high school,
I became acquainted with Judge Bodley. He was about 5 feet 5 inches
high and weighed about 120 pounds. He was gentle, genial, polished
and to me very, entertaining, always taking a deep interest in our
studies, games and hunting. Several times he gave me needed encouragement and very valuable advice. I always regarded him as a
fine type of the good citizen, the able, honorable lawyer and the
modest, well-bred gentleman. He died April 7, 1877.
In the important case of the City of Louisville v. the Trustees
of the University of Louisville (1855), 15 B. Monr. 642 to 742 (cited
as authority in Graded School, etc. v. Trustees of Bracken Academy
(1894), 95 Ky. 436, and Elliott v. City of Louisville (1906), 123
Ky. 278), he and Messrs. Frye and Page represented the city. Messrs.
S. S. Nicholas and Bland Ballard (later U. S. District Judge) were
attorneys for the University. The attorneys for the appellant claimed that the University was a civil or public corporation; the appellees, that it was a private corporation. Both sides laid much stress
on the decision and dicta in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheaton 640. The court, through Chief Justice Thomas A. Marshall, held that the University, though receiving property for education, was not such a public corporation as the legislature could
control at pleasure, and affirmed the judgment; but Judge Hise
dissented. Judge Bodley's argument, as summarized in the report,
was strong; and I hear that lately a bookseller of New York advertised for a c~py of his brief offering to pay $7.50 for a copy.
Judge William F. Bullock, whose wife was the sister of Judge
Bodley's.wife, was born January 16, 1807, in Fayette County. He
graduated at Transylvania University in 1824. When a youth, he
was selected to deliver the welcome address to Henry Clay after his
vote for President Adams. Judge Bullock began to practice law
in 1828. While he was a member of the legislature, he introduced
the bill to establish the common school system in this State. He was
the leading promoter for the School for the Blind, and was later
President of the American Printing House for the Blind, a Kentucky corporation. He was appointed circuit judge here in 1846;
and, when judges had to be elected uhder the Constitution of 1850,
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he was elected by the people. In 1849 he was a professor in the Law
School of the University of Louisville. In 1835, he resigned his
judgeship to practice at the bar.
He was a small, slender man, not exceeding five feet, five or
six inches in height, very dignified and courtly in manner, with a
beautiful, well modulated voice. In speaking, he was clear, forcible
and eloquent. I heard him make a speech in the large criminal court
room covering the western half of the third floor of the old court
house. It was about 1875. This meeting had been called to denounce the act of General De Trobriand, who, with the approval of
General Grant, drove the Democratic members of the Louisiana
legislature from the State House. Judge Bullock's speech, apparently extemporaneous, received great, enthusiastic applause. It
was considered far better than the speeches of those who had apparently prepared themselves for this important meeting.
Judge William L. Jackson, Sr., was born in Clarksburg, Virginia, in 1825. He was Commonwealth's Attorney there, a member
of the legislature, Lieutenant Governor in 1856, and a circuit judge
in 1860; but in 1861 he resigned his office to become a Colonel in the
Confederate Infantry. He was a cousin of General Stonewall Jackson and, for a while, on his staff, but later commanded a brigade of
cavalry. In 1861 he sent his family to Kentucky. Shortly after the
war, he came to Louisville to join them and to practice law here. He
was a tall, well proportioned, sociable man, with an impressive,
military manner. Having ability and good address, he soon acquired
clients, but most of his practice was in the criminal courts. In
1868 he formed a partnership with Edward Y. Parsons. In 1872
General Jackson was appointed circuit judge by Governor Leslie to
fill a vacancy, and later was elected for a term. He continued as
circuit judge until his death in 1890. On account of his special skill
in the trial of criminal cases, he was selected to preside at the trial
of Col. Thomas Buford, for the murder of Judge Elliott, and for
other similar trials in various places in Kentucky.
William L. Jackson, Jr., was born in Virginia August 12, 1854.
As boys, we were good friends, but later political differences, for a
time, lessened our intimacy. He graduated at the high school with
credit in 1874 and got his law degree at the University of Louisville in 1876. In 1881 he was elected to the legislature for that term
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and for two succeeding terms. On the death of his father in 1890
he was given his father's place on the bench, and worthily filled that
office till his death in January, 1896. Being at all times affable,
frank and manly, he was very popular, and was a good lawyer. For
some years before he died, he was a great sufferer from the lingering disease that finally caused his death. As long as he could sit
on the bench, however, he performed his duties well, though suffering great pain all the time. Before he was raised to the bench, his
firm was first Jackson & Phelps, and later O'Neal, Jackson & Phelps.
Mr. Zach Phelps, by tact, shrewdness and much experience, became very expert in the examination of witnesses and had considerable success. Mr. Joseph T. O'Neal was one of the best jury lawyers
here in his time. He was popular with the lawyers and the public,
and expert, not only in the examination of witnesses, but also in a
closing argument. In the whole management of a jury trial, in civil
or criminal cases, he was very efficient and successful. These men
learned early the value of "suavity," in and out of court, and, believing "that it is easier to catch flies with sugar than with vinegar,"
they accomplished much by urbanity.
Edward Y. Parsons was born in Jefferson County December
12, 1842, a son of the Rev. C. D. Parsons, who was first an actor and
then a Methodist minister. The son got his education at the male
high school and in the law school of the University of Louisville. He
was a partner of Judge W. L. Jackson, Sr., from 1868 to 1872 and
later of Col. Marc Mundy, who had also been an actor. In 1874,
Parsons was elected to Congress, and he died in Washington July
8, 1876, being succeeded by Col. Henry Watterson, the distinguished
editor of Kentucky.Mr. Parsons was a tall, handsome man, though one leg was
slightly shorter than the other. He had a beautiful voice, and was
very dramatic and popular as a speaker. His election to Congress
was the result of the popularity he gained in defending Miss Ellen
Goodwin, who had for years dogged the footsteps of Col. John W.
Throekmorton, manager of the Galt House. She dressed in black,
and would stand, for hours, silent and alone, like a voiceless sentinel,
wherever Throckmorton was, whether at the hotel or in a store or
in some private house. I believe she claimed that he had wronged
her, but he stoutly denied it. Whether she kept up her vigilant
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watching because she had some uncontrollable illusion, or because
she was simply enamored with him, or because he had given her some
reason, was long a matter of dispute. Finally, Throckmorton took
some legal proceedings against her and Parsons defended her successfully, and thereby won great local fame.
Judge Adolphus Edward Richards was born in Loudonn County,
Virginia, May 26, 1844. He studied first in the Military Academy
and later at Randolph Macon College, but when the Civil War began, he marched from the campus to the battlefield as a private in
the Cavalry Troops of General Turner Ashby; but later served
under General John S. Mosby; and, for repeated gallantry on the
field, rose rapidly to the rank of Major before 21 years of age. After
the war, he spent two years at the University of Virginia, one of
those years being spent on law under the able and distinguished
John B. Minor. He completed his education at the University of
Louisville and entered the bar here in 1868. Not long afterward,
he became the partner of General Basil W. Duke. In 1880 he was
Democratic elector for the State at large and in August, 1882, was
elected judge of the Superior Court, which was organized to help
the Court of Appeals to clear its overburdened docket. Four years
later he returned to the practice of the law in Louisville. He was attorney of the city of Louisville for four years or more. His rank as
a lawyer was high.
Judge Richards, though not a brilliant man, had sterling qualities
of great value. He was always courteous, refined, diligent and fearless. His good sense, modesty, studious habits, and careful consideration of any matter before him gave his opinions great weight.
He had not only integrity, but a fine sense of honor. While other
men made much of their war record, he was too well-bred to boast,
and too conscientious to exploit his courage or his patriotism.
The judge of a police court in a big city has a hard task. He
has to deal with the ignorant, the unfortunate poor, the wasted
wrecks, and the vicious of all kinds. He must have some knowledge
of law, but he must also be keen, shrewd, humane, and, to the vicious,
fihn and stern. A knowledge of human nature, in all its varied and
puzzling aspect, in all its lights and shadows, must be the result of
long, patient thought and wide experience. He will often hear
puzzling lies and false complaints; he will see real harships, vile
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habits, dense ignorance, and unblushing, degraded vice. He must
pentrate through innumerable shams. His heart must not allow
him to be too hard on the frail, and he must try to save the helpless
victims of idleness or crime, while sometimes holding back the hand
of small or big political meddlers or petty tyrants, who like to bully
the poor or the weak. We care too little what happens to the poor
and friendless.
Judge J. Hop Price, who, for a long time, was our police judge,
seemed to have many of the qualities for that difficult place. He was
a man of moderate education but great shrewdenss, and had a good
knowledge of criminal law. In early life he had sown some wild oats
hinself and he had many clients among the poor and the criminal
classes; but he was an honest man and had a sound judgment. Few
could fool him as to the merits of the cases he tried. He was gentle
to the poor and the frail, but severe to the callous vagabond and
hard as flint to the dangerous criminal. When a beginner, he bought
some law books to read, and a veteran of the bar in the criminal
courts of that day said to him: "Hop, don't you fool with those
books. You have a good instinct and common sense judgment for
the law. Those books will only confuse you."
I saw on Sunday in the Courier-Journal that a farmer of Indiana,
who came to Jeffersonville and sold his beans on Saturday, without
having license plates on both sides of his automobile, was fined $1.00.
The costs were $10.00. In a different kind of case in Jefferson County
lately there was a fine of $2.00 and costs of $10.00. Such a result
is outrageous. Cases of this kind are often crushing blows to the
poor, even to the honest poor in cases where there was no intentional
violation of law. Our officers should be paid for their services in
the administration of justice; but not in that way. We care too little
what happens to the unknown poor or friendless, to whom an unexpected call for $10.00 or $12.00 or for a bond for one or two hundred
dollars may mean a great sacrifice or a time in the jail or in the
workhouse. A year or two ago, an honorable man here, who owned
real estate worth $10,000.00, who had never been hailed to court before as defendant, juror, or witness, was arrested late Saturday afternoon on a baseless charge of malicious assault. It was charged that,
several days before, while he was driving a small automobile slowly
along the street he had bumped against a woman who slipped down
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on the street. His bond was fixed by some underling at $300.00.
He would have had to spend all Saturday night in jail for want of
a bond, if an old, influential friend, on whom he happened to be
calling in the nick of time, in fact at the very time of the arrest,
had not been allowed to put up for him, by special indulgence, a good
check for $300.00 until a bondsman could be gotten Monday morning.
Mr. Byron Bacon once wrote for me, at my request, a report
of the trial of his first case, a trial in a court of a justice of the peace.
Dr. Dwyer, a dentist, was suing ir. Schmidt for $60.00, the price
of a set of teeth for Mrs. Schmidt. When the case was called for trial,
Mr. Bacon, attorney for the plaintiff, went to the front door of the
office and, after looking up the street, came back and said that he
was. ready for trial; that his witness was coming. Mir. William F.
Barrett, attorney for the other side, wdnt to the door, looked up the
street, and said his witness was coming. At that time, the litigants
could not testify for themselves. The plaintiff had to rely entirely
on a brother dentist's testimony. Mr. Bacon examined Dr. Wilson
as follows:
"Q. What is your profession? A. Dentist, sir. Q. Are you
acquainted with the parties, plaintiff and defendant? A. Well acquainted, sir. Q. What is Dr. Dwyer's profession? A. Dentist, sir.
Q. How does he stand in his profession? A. At the top, sir, unexcelled. Q. What do you knqw of Dr. Dwyer's making a double set
of teeth for Mrs. Schmidt? A. Mr. Schmidt came with his wife to
my office and exhibited to me a double set of teeth, stating that they
were made for his wife by Dr. Dwyer. Q. Did you examine the
teeth? A. Yes, sir. Q. Will you describe them, and say what they
were as to workmanship? A. They were mounted on gold plate,
and were a most' exquisite piece of workmanship, Mir. Bacon. Q.
What is such a set of teeth worth, Doctor. A. Well worth $60.00,
sir."

MR. BAirR's CROSS-EXAMATION.
"Doctor, did you examine those teeth in connection with Mrs.
Schmidt's mouth? A. Oh, yes. Q. Did'they fit her? A. Not at all,
sir. Q. Doctor, is not the object of an artificial set of teeth to enable
the user to masticate? A. Yes, sir. Q. Could Mrs. Schmidt have
masticated with hers? A. Oh, no, sir. She had better 'gumwec it.'
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Q. What effect had these teeth upon Mrs. Schmidt? A. They made
her sick, sir-brought on a spell of nervous prostration. Q. Well,
Doctor, considering the fact that they did not fit her, and she could
not masticate with them, and had better 'gummed it,' and that they
induced a spell of nervous prostration, what are these teeth worth
to her? A. Nothing, sir, nothing."

MR.

BACON'S REDIRECT EXAMINATION

"Q. Doctor, how were those teeth mounted? A. Mounted on
a gold plate, sir-very heavy, sir. By utilizing that gold plate, I
saved $20.00 in the cost of making new teeth."
MR.

BARaETT'S

REcRoss

EXAMINATION

"Q. Doctor, in that conversation in your office with Mr. Schmdit,
was anything said about that gold plate? A. Oh, yes, Mr. Schnidt
stated that he furnished the gold plate to Dr. Dwyer."
Judgment for defendant.
On the strength of "an ayred david" of Judge Thomas R.
Gordon, I venture to relate what he heard one day in a court in Eastern Kentucky, where many Anglo-Saxon names are still heard. The
court called the case of the Commonwealth v. Pigg. The accused was
the supervisor of a county road, who had been indicted for not keeping the road in proper repair. When the case was called, a man
of enormous size rose and said: "Judge, I ain't ready yet. My witnesses are here, but my lawyer ain't here. He w I1 be here this
evening." "Who is your lawyer?" said the judge. Mr. Pigg replied;
"My lawyer is Mr. Hogg."
Mr. Frank P. Straus, early in his promising career at the bar
in Shepherdsville, brought a suit for a young lady of the county
against a young man of the same county for slande. The defendant
had said to others that she had granted him favors that an unmarried
woman is not allowed to grant. A big crowd gathered to hear the
proceedings. Mr. Straus put his client on the stand and, after a
few preliminary questions, said: "Miss Birdie, how long have you
known the defendant?" "Several years," she said. "Have you ever
been alone in his company?" "Yes, sir; many times." "Did you or
not ever have any improper or immoral relations with him in all
your life?" "No, sir; never." Here, Mr. Straus, rose and, looking
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over the crowd with a proud air, said impressively in a melodramatic
manner and tone: "Did you ever do anything improper with him
at any time or in any place?" "No, sir," said the witness. There
was first a deep slience and then some indignant muttering in the
crowd. "I will go further,'.' said Mr. Straus. "Did you ever, at any
time or in any place, have any improper relations with any man?"
"No, sir; never-but once." "Call the next case," said the Judge
of the court.
After Mr. Straus had moved to Louisville and had been a successful advocate, he was once defending the Louisville Railway Company in a dangerous suit for damages. The plaintiff was suing for a
permanent injury to her shoulder, caused while she was a passenger
on a street car. She charged that, as she was leaving the car, she
was hurled to the street-by the sudden start of the car. He had
forgotten to request the court before the trial to select a physician
or surgeon to examine the plaintiff's shoulder. When the case was
called, he made that request, and the judge himself selected Dr.
Cottell, who was notified and consented to come to court immediately.
Meanwhile, the plaintiff was put on the stand as a witness. She
testified that she had been hurt when leaving the car; that she had
been greatly ihjured in her shoulder; that it had been sound before;
that it had been permanently impaired by the accident and apparently never could be cured. Before her cross-examination had been
concluded, Dr. Cottell appeared and was instructed bir the court
to go with the lady to the jury room and to examine her shoulder.
When the doctor returned, the cross-examination was interrupted
that he might be put on the stand at once to save his time. Both
the plaintiff's lawyer and Mr. Straus were afraid to examine him.
-not knowing what he was going to say; but at last Mr. Straus unddrtook the examination. "Doctor, have you examined the plaintiff's
shoulder?" "Yes, sir." "What is the condition of her shoulder?"
"It is very bad." "Is the injury temporary or permanent, doctor?"
"It is permanent; there is no cure for it. She can't lift her arm high."
Mr. Straus was greatly discouraged, and proceeded reluctantly.
"Doctor, do you know whether her injury is such as could have been
prgduced by a fall from the step of a street car?" "Well, sir, it is
strange but true that I treated that shoulder twenty years -ago. Its
condition now is the same as it was then. I told this lady it could
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never be cured." When the doctor said this, the plaintiff gave a
hysterical scream and fell on the floor. Her attorney dismissed the
petition.
Judge John Watson Barr was born in Versailles, Ky., December 17, 1826. He got his diploma in law at Transylvania University
in Lexington and began his practice in Versailles in 1847. Later he
was elected county attorney, defeating his later partner, 1r. Goodloe. In 1854 Mr. Barr moved to Louisville. He was first a partner
of MTr. Joseph B. Kinkead for eight years. Thereafter for several
years, he had no partner. Then he and Col. John Kemp Goodloe
became partners. In 1862 Mr. Barr was elected a member of the
city council and prepared the law that established the Board of
Sinking Fund Commissioners; he became its president; and planned
and carried out the measures necessary to protect the credit and
provide for the debt of the city. About 1871 Mr. Alexander P.
Humphrey joined the fnrm of Barr and Goodloe and it thus continued until April 16, 1880, when Judge Barr, without any request
from him, was appointed United States District Judge by President
Hayes. At the bar, he was making about four times the salary of
the judge; but the savings of past years had made him independent.
After his appointment, he whs sometimes called to sit as a member
of the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
In early life, Judge Barr was a Whig, but when that party, in
1855, was absorbed by the Know-Nothing or American Party, he voted
the Democratic ticket. During the war, he was a loyal Unionist. He
took a prominent part in raising and organizing Union troops, and
was an officer in the home guards. He was long the attorney and a
director of the old and staunch Bank of Kentucky; but resigned his
directorship when he was raised to the bench. After 19 years of
faithful service, he retired from the bench February 21, 1899. In
the summer of that year, in spite of his age, he consented, as a matter of duty, to act as one of the three election commissioners of the
county, in order to prevent any fraud in the November election. It
was a path of thorns, but he intelligently and diligently performed
his task, in spite of disagreeable contentions and obstructions by his
colleagues. His services were urgently needed and the people applauded his fairness, zeal and courage. He died January 1, 1908.
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In his home and as a citizen, he was all that a man should be.
What he was on the bench, the older members of the bar well know;
but the testimony of ex-President William H. Taft, at the time Judge
Barr retired, well expresses the opinion of those most capable of
judging. Judge Taft, then on the bench of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals at Cincinnati, wrote to a committee of the
Louisville lawyers, who had called a meeting of the bar to express
their regret at the retirement of the judge, as follows:
"I have toward Judge Barr a mingled feeling of filial affection
and comradeship. Take him for all in all, I do not expect to see his
like again. In no other judge did I ever see the desire to put his
mind in a condition exactly impartial between the parties so intense as in him. His nature is so gentle, his manner is so courteous,
his treatment of opposing counsel so deferential, that his firmness
in enforcing his views, once made up, and his just wrath, roused
by trifling or chicanery or fraud clearly established, by their very
contrast give them a quality best described as awe-inspiring. Judge
Barr's colleagues have a genuine love for him, the same feeling
which I know the Louisville bar have. I have noted the fact that so
tender are you in bearing and respect for him that, in practically
every case of an appeal from his decision, the appellant's counsel
feels called upon to refer to his affection for the judge and his professional respect for his learning, ability and impartiality. His successor will have a most difficult task in filling his place."
Judge William S. Pryor, a Democrat, and on the Court of Appeals bench 25 years, wrote to the committee his regret that he could
not come to the meeting, and said of Judge Barr: "With an honest
mind and a purity of character unexcelled, connected with a legal
ability of the highest order, he made a model judge. A mind free from
bias, his decisions were always- accepted as the offering of an honest
conviction. Younger members of the profession should strive to
emulate his goodness as a man and his greatness as a judge."
The resolutions of the bar, prepared and read by Mr. Temple
Bodley, said:
"For nineteen years, the painstaking labor, the large learning,
the perfect impartiality, the patient attention, the breadth of reflection, the justness of judgment, the inflexibility of doing the very
right-according to the law, the humanity, the considerate courtesy,
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the gentleness of manner with which justice has been rendered
upon this bench have caused the bar and the people of Kentucky withone accord to declare him a model judge."
Shortly after Judge Barr's death, when Judge Taft was Secretary of War, and a candidate for the Presidency, he spoke to a
large audience in Louisville April 10, 1908, and, after paying a complimentary tribute to the bar of Louisville, said:
"It was my great good fortune, under those circumstances, to
be acquainted with, to become a warm friend and a profound admirer
of one who, since I was last in Louisville, has gone to his long home,
a man who had in his nature a finer sense of judicial quality than
any man I ever knew. Sweet-tempered, a profound lawyer, and industrious public servant, with whom conscience stood higher than
anything else, a man whom it was an elevation to know-John Watson Barr."
The greatest Kentucky advocate and orator whom I have heard
and known well enough to judge him fairly was my friend Col.
William C. P. Breckinridge. I have heard him on various themes
and under all sorts of conditions. His gift of eloquence was cultivated by study and constant practice. He was handsome in face and
form; in bearing, courtly and deferential but manly. His tenor voice
was clear, strong and musical; his enunciation, distinct; his gestures,
graceful; his diction, elegant; his periods, well polished and rounded.
He had diligently studied literature, history, political economy and
law. On a platform or in court, he was suave, resourceful and persuasive, though, when necessary, sarcastic and bolci. He had a delicate fancy, keen wit, and genuine humor. To scholarly men or
plain farmers, he could speak entertainingly, forcibly and eloquently,
nicely fitting his style to his theme and both to his audience. He had
a vivid imagination and many of the qualities of a poet, as all genuine orators have. His well-used pen was as deft and powerful as his
tongue. When he had appealed convincingly to the reason and
judgment of his hearers, he could make their blood tingle by a tender
appeal or a happy expression of noble and stirring sentiments.
Half educated, flowery declaimers and insincere, plausible
demagogues are numerous. They win temporary applause from the
dull or the vulgar; but such laurels soon wither. True orators and
great advocates flourish only where enlightenment, justice and free-
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dom reign. Public office and money and all its luxurious accompaniments, may sometimes be won without learning, sterling integrity, and the noble gift of eloquence; but, as Horace said of
public honors, riches and all their coveted baubles-Sunt qui non
habeant; est qui non curat lubere-there are s6me who have them
not and there is one who does not care to have them, if they must
be gotten in the usual way; and yet true success in a noble calling
is worth a lifetime of honorable toil. The upward path is steep;
the summit, few can reach. The real devotee of the law, well-prepared, with a stout heart, a pure mind, and genuine talents, may,
as he rises, by worth, enjoy independence, inward content and the
gratifying esteem of good men. These are the 'golden fruits of a
virtuous and useful life. They may be won in almost any calling,
but only by those that are truly fit for the task.

